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I. Introduction
A. IMPACT OF RECENT EVENTS
The following article describes and analyzes certain aspects of recent legal
change in a predominantly Muslim country in Africa. The amendment of
state legislation in an attempt to apply Islamic law is an occurrence or, at the
least, an important issue of current debate in many countries in the world.'
The lessons to be learned from the Sudanese experience will of course vary
from state to state because the process by which Islamic law is implemented
involves different players on each national scene.
The major protagonist in the Sudan with regard to Islamization and other
matters was, until recently, the former President, Ga'afar Nimeiri. Follow-
ing weeks of public demonstrations and strikes, President Nimeiri was
deposed in a military coup on April 6, 1985. The new regime, headed by a
Transitional Military Council along with a civilian cabinet appointed by the
Council, is expected to remain in power for an estimated twelve months,
after which elections are to be held. In the meantime, the Council has taken
several steps of relevance to the subject of this article: the 1973 Sudanese
Constitution has been indefinitely suspended, with a new constitution ex-
pected to be drafted following elections; the National People's Assembly,
*Member of the Bars of Ohio and of the District of Columbia; Visiting Lecturer in Law in
the University of Khartoum, 1984; Advisor to the Attorney General's Chambers, Khartoum.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance given to him by members of the staff of the
Attorney General's Chambers in Khartoum, among whom special thanks are given to Shawgi
Hussein Mohammed, Paulino Wanawilla Unango, and Mustafa El Rashid. The conclusions
presented herein are the author's alone and should not be taken as representing the views of the
Attorney General's Chambers, its staff, or the Government of Sudan.
1. See generally M. HOOKER, ISLAMIC LAW IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA (1984); J. ESPOSITO, ISLAM
AND POLITICS (1984); ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (J. Piscatori, ed. 1983); Egypt Rejects
Imposition of Islamic Law, Int'l Herald Tribune, May 6, 1985, at 1.
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which is the parliament for the Sudan under the 1973 Constitution, has been
disbanded pending new elections; and the sole legal political party under the
1973 Constitution, the Sudan Socialist Union, has been dissolved.
Although the implementation and application of Islamic law provided a
major impetus for some of the public dissent leading up to the coup d'etat of
April 1985,2 all of the legislation of the Nimeiri regime, including that based
on Islamic law, remains in effect. 3 As a result, at least as of the date this
article went to press, the conclusions reached hereinafter remain valid.
Whether or not various Islamic-based legislation in the Sudan will be re-
pealed or amended by the new Sudanese government remains, however,
unknown.4 On May 15, 1985, the Sudanese Attorney General announced
that committees were being formed to consider the revision of legislation,5
but the duration of these committees and the standards to be applied by
them are yet to be determined.
No legal system, of course, remains static. In order to understand any
state's legal machinery and philosophy, "we must know what it has been and
what it tends to become." 6 The recent implementation of Islamic law in the
Sudan has left its mark on the country's legal system, whatever changes may
be made in the future. Moreover, the Sudanese experience of Islamization
has been observed carefully by Muslim reformers in other countries, and
thus the substance and method of Sudan's experience provide an important
chapter in the movement to Islam in many parts of the world today.
B. SUDANESE LEGAL MOVEMENT TOWARDS ISLAM
Since August, 1983, the legal system of the Democratic Republic of
Sudan, 7 which geographically is the largest country in Africa and which has a
population of approximately 22 million, has undergone nothing less than a
revolution in changing its legal system to one based primarily on Islamic
law. 8 The volume of Sudanese legislative changes affects both substantive
2. See generally M. KHALID, NIMEIRI AND THE REVOLUTION OF DIS-MAY (1985); Jacobs,
Sudan's Islamization, 84 CURRENT HIST. 205 (May 1985).
3. On April 9, 1985, the Chairman of the Sudanese Transitional Military Council issued
Decree no. 5 which states that all laws in existence as of April 6, 1985 shall remain valid until
such time that they have been repealed or amended.
4. See Sudan's Amputees Don't Miss Nimeiri, Wash. Post May 6, 1985, at 17 (Nat'l Weekly
Ed.); A Joyful, Fragile Revival, TIME, April 22, 1985, at 14.
5. BRITISH BROADCASTING COMPANY, Africa Report (May 15, 1985)(radio report).
6. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
7. The Sudan became an independent state on January 1, 1956. From 1899 until indepen-
dence, the territory was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and was governed under an
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of January 19, 1899, 1 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 7 (4th
ed. 1955), reprinted in M. ABBAS, THE SUDAN QUESTION 157 (1951).
8. For sources providing an historical perspective on the Sudanese legal system, see Z.
MUSTAFA, COMMON LAW IN THE SUDAN (1971); Khalil, The LegalSystem of the Sudan, 20 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 624 (1971); Mustafa, Sudan, in JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 274 (A.
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and procedural laws, as well as both criminal and civil legislation, and these
unprecedented changes have placed substantial pressure on the judiciary,
government officials, and the bar to keep pace. A partial listing of new
legislative acts since 1983 illustrates the breadth of these changes: Road
Traffic Act, 1983; Civil Procedure Act, 1983; Advocates Act, 1983; Penal
Code, 1983; Evidence Act, 1983; Criminal Procedure Act, 1983; Judiciary
Acts, 1983 and 1984; Attorney General Act, 1983; Supreme Council of the
Judiciary Act, 1983; Khartoum Province Act, 1983; National Training Act,
1983; Public Service Rules Act, 1983; People's Armed Forces Act, 1983;
Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983; Order of Ma'arouf and Prohibition of
Munkar Act, 1983; Civil Transactions Act, 1984; Zakat Tax Act, 1984;
Excise Duty Act, 1983; Customs Act (Amendment), 1984; Exporters and
Importers Registration Act, 1984; Prisons Act, 1984; Auditor-General Act,
1984; Employees Trade Unions Act (Amendment), 1984; and Industrial
Relations Act (Amendment), 1984.
Much of the new legislation was reportedly drafted by a small committee
of lawyers (said to be three in number) within the Presidential Palace. New
terms and concepts from Islamic law, especially in the Civil Transactions
Act, 1984, 9 are not always sufficiently defined in the new legislation. This
has created considerable uncertainty as to the scope and effect of some of
the new laws, although some of the interstices in the laws have been clarified
through the issuance of judicial circulars by the Chief Justice of the
Sudanese Supreme Court and by rulings (fatwas) by certain Sudanese
bodies. The Attorney General's Chambers, located in Khartoum, a division
of which has historically actively participated in the drafting of new laws, 10
has not played any substantial role in the preparation of the new legislation.
There are instances, some of them of critical importance for the economy,
where new laws differ from old unrepealed or unamended ones, the most
important example being the Companies Act of 1925,11 which is still in
effect, as conflicting with the chapter on companies and partnerships in the
Civil Transactions Act, 1984.12 In addition, the absence as yet of official
Allotted. 1970); Lufti, The Future of the English Law in the Sudan, 1967 SUDAN L.J. & REP. 219;
Thompson, The Formative Era of the Law of the Sudan, 1965 SUDAN L.J. & REP. 475; Farran,
Oversea Influence of English Law, 105 SOLICITORS' J. 902 (1961); Khalid, The Laws Adminis-
tered by the Civil Courts in the Sudan, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 159 (1961); Rannat, The Relationship
Between Islamic and Customary Law in the Sudan, 4 J. AFR. L. 9 (1960); Guttman, The
Reception of the Common Law in the Sudan, 6 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 401 (1957); Guttman, A
Survey of the Sudan Legal System, 1956 SUDAN L.J. & REP. 7.
9. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
10. The Attorney General's Act, 1981, 11 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 325 (5th ed. 1982), provided
at § 5(2)(e) that the Attorney General "shall have the function ... to draft bills and all other
legislative provisions of the State." This provision is reproduced verbatim in the Attorney
General Act, 1983 § 5(2)(e), which repealed the 1981 act.
11. 1 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 240 (5th ed. 1976).
12. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
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published English translations for all of the new legislation,13 in a country
where many lawyers and judges studied law in English, coupled with the
absence to date of authoritative judicial interpretations of the new laws, has
furthered the absence of legal clarity during this transition period.
This article reviews selected aspects of the Sudanese legal system as
modified since August 1983. Following a description in Part II of the current
legal environment (which includes an examination of a potentially far-
reaching new religiously oriented statute), the concept of Shari'a that under-
lies Sudan's Islamization effort is discussed (Part III). Part IV describes the
state of emergency that was declared in April 1984 and some of the legal
repercussions that followed. In Part V, certain aspects of the Civil Transac-
tions Act, 1984, which is of major importance to, inter alia, commerce, are
analyzed. Lastly, Part VI addresses the prohibition against charging in-
terest, in particular with respect to Sudan's banking industry.
II. The Current Legal Environment
The breadth of new legislation promulgated by President Nimeiri, and
approved by the National People's Assembly, is nothing short of staggering.
The bulk of the new acts can conveniently be categorized into five groups.
The largest group is comprised of statutes regulating the operations of
courts, and includes: (1) the Civil Procedure Act, 1983; (2) the Evidence
Act, 1983; (3) the Criminal Procedure Act, 1983; (4) the Judgments (Basic
Rules) Act, 1983; and (5) the Supreme Council of the Judiciary Act, 1983.
The second group of statutes involves the organization of courts and regula-
tion of legal personnel, and includes: (1) the Judiciary Acts, 1983 and 1984;
(2) the Advocates Act, 1983; and (3) the Attorney General Act, 1983. The
third group involves tax related matters, and includes: (1) the Zakat Tax
Act, 1984; (2) the Excise Duty Act, 1983; and (3) the Customs Act (Amend-
ments), 1984. The fourth group is comprised of a miscellany of important
substantive laws, including: (1) the Road Traffic Act, 1983; (2) the Penal
Code, 1983; (3) the Khartoum Province Act, 1983; and (4) the Civil Trans-
actions Act, 1984. The final group contains a purely religiously oriented
statute, entitled "The Order of Ma'arouf and Prohibition of Munkar
Act, 1983" (Ma'arouf-Munkar Act);14 that Act has as yet uncertain implica-
tions and thus deserves separate mention here.
The Ma'arouf-Munkar Act was promulgated by President Nimeiri on
November 3, 1983. Ma'arouf is defined in the Act as including "all matters
13. Under the Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act, 1974, 7 LAWS OF THE SUDAN
136 (5th ed. 1982) § 7(1), bills are to be prepared and laws passed in Arabic, "provided that an
English translation thereof approved by the Attorney General shall be made and published in
the Gazette."
14. The Order of Ma'arouf and Prohibition of Munkar Act, 1983, § 2.
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permitted by Shari'a law"; munkar is defined as including "all matters
forbidden by Shari'a law." 15 One Islamic scholar states that ma'arouf liter-
ally means "the known," and is sometimes referred to as being the equiva-
lent of equity, while munkar is considered to mean misbelief and miscon-
duct, sometimes taken to mean "that which all just men would judge to be
evil." ' 16 The original source for the concept of prescribing ma'arouf and
forbidding munkar is in several verses of the Koran (sometimes transliter-
ated as "Qur'an"),' 7 although Islamic scholars disagree whether the reli-
gious obligation respecting ma'arouf-munkar is addressed to all Muslims or
only to some of them.
18
The Sudanese Ma'arouf-Munkar Act provides that either associations of
persons, as provided for under the Act, or individual persons may order
prohibition of any "Munkar act" they witness. Section 4(1) of the Act states:
"Any matter which contradicts the rules sent by God or causes injury or
harm to any individual or the group or causes something of the same shall be
subject to prohibition." Section 4(2), without limiting the generality of
Section 4(1), states that the following munkar matters, among others, may
be prohibited: "disobedience, little or grievous"; "showing disrespect to the
public tranquility or public places in any manner"; or "bad customs harming
public health or the society." The Act states that an order of ma'arouf, on
the other hand, may be made in the following areas, among others: "order
of work and production"; "order of good practices in buying and selling";
and "order of obedience in general." The Act provides that persons who
order ma'arouf or prohibit munkar acts shall enjoy the same immunity as
enjoyed by judges, except as they might violate Shari'a or the law, 19 and that
any person or association authorized to order ma'arouf or prohibit munkar
can refer the matter to a court for resolution. 20 Because of the broad scope
of the matters potentially covered by the Ma'arouf-Munkar Act, including
matters relating to business, the actual practice under the Act will have to be
studied separately to determine its practical application. In the meantime, it
has been reported that President Nimeiri has criticized various excesses of
persons acting pursuant to the Act.
2
'
As the Ma'arouf-Munkar Act demonstrates by way of example, and as
may also be seen from the text of the Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983,
which is appended hereto, nearly all of the legislation promulgated in Sudan
15. For the definition of the term Shari'a and a discussion on its basic principles, see infra text
accompanying notes 36-60.
16. R. LEVY, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ISLAM 194-5 (1957).
17. See THE HOLY QUR'AN, 3:104, 110, 114; 7:157; 31:17 (A. Yusuf Ali trans. 1938).
18. M. ANSAR, MAROOF AND MUNKAR 35-60 (A. Ashraf trans. 1984).
19. Ma'arouf-Munkar Act, supra note 14, § 8. For a description of Shari'a, see infra text
accompanying notes 36-60.
20. Ma'arouf-Munkar Act, supra note 14, § 10.
21. ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REV., Nov. 1984, at 20.
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since August 1983 in one way or another refers to or purports to incorporate
Islamic legal precepts, in accord with President Nimeiri's pronounced "leg-
islative revolution" to change the legal system to one which applies Islamic
Shari'a throughout. The concerted effort to implement Shari'a in the Sudan
may be seen as part of the apparent resurgence of Islam throughout the area
of the Muslim world ranging from Indonesia to Morocco. 22 In any event, in
accord with Islamic political philosophy, the ruler of an Islamic state has the
principal duty of applying Islamic law. 23 Indeed, under classical Muslim
thought, a justification for overthrowing the leader of the state arose when
the leader's policies and practices failed to uphold or violated the principles
of Shari'a.24 President Nimeiri justified Sudan's implementation of Islamic
law in terms of returning to the country's roots and ridding the state's legal
system of the last vestiges of colonial influence.
25
In the Sudan, the source of all the major new laws has been the committee
within the Presidential Palace, operating at the direction of the President
and certain selected advisors. The laws have then been promulgated pur-
suant to Article 106 of the 1973 Constitution as "provisional orders": such
orders take legal effect on the date of their promulgation by the President,
and subsequently must be approved by the People's Assembly. 26 In all
instances, so far as is known, every "provisional order" promulgated by the
22. One author recently stated:
The reason why reformed Islam is so influential of late is that it has certain conspicuous
traits-strict unitarianism, sobriety, orderliness, scripturalism, egalitarianism-which are
consonant with the organizational and ideological requirements of an industrializing age.
Gellner, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 1984, at 30.
23. D. PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD: ISLAM AND POLITICAL POWER 43 (1983); Anderson &
Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 917, 929 (1958).
On the duties and powers of the Islamic ruler, see generally R. Levy, supra note 16, at 271-354.
24. I qbal, Democracy and the Modern Islamic State, in VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM 252,253
(J. Esposito ed. 1983); Osman, Shura and Democracy, ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REV.,
May, 1984, at 76, 78. For a contrary view, see Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic
Law, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.0. 49, 59 (1957): "[T]he judiciary found itself powerless to intervene
against a ruler who flagrantly violated the principles of the Shari'a. They were forced to the
doctrine that to endure such unjust government was to accept the lesser of two evils by avoiding
civil strife."
25. See, e.g., Address by President Nimeiri given in Khartoum at the opening session of the
International Conference on the Implementation of Shari'a in Sudan (Sept. 22, 1984), repro-
duced in English in AL-AYAM (Khartoum), Sept. 26, 1984 (Supp.); see also SUDANOW
(a monthly magazine published by the Sudanese government), Oct. 1983, at 10 (in a published
interview, the former Sudanese Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Dafalla el Haj Yousif,
made the same points as President Nimeiri made in id.).
26. 6 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 348 (5th ed. 1982). Art. 106 states in part: "If at any time when the
People's Assembly is not in session or in cases of importance and urgency, the President of the
Republic may issue Provisional Republican Orders having the force of law. Such Provisional
Orders shall be submitted to the People's Assembly within fifteen days from the date of issue if
the People's Assembly is in existence, or at the first meeting in case of dissolution, or
propagation or end of session." The extent of the use of "provisional orders" by the President
has been controversial in the past. See SuDANOW, May 1978, at 22.
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President, at least since August 1983, has been approved by the Assembly
without amendment. 27 It is significant, in considering the current legal
environment, that, although the People's Assembly has the authority to
initiate legislation,28 since the President has undertaken his "legislative
revolution," the Assembly, so far as is known, has not done so, at least as to
any of the major legislation.
It was reported on May 15, 1984, however, that the People's Assembly
formed a committee to revise and amend the 1973 Constitution of the
Sudan. 29 On June 6, 1984, President Nimeiri presented a five-point proposal
to the People's Assembly outlining his "guidelines to be considered by the
members during the debate on amendment of the Constitution. "30 As
reported, the President's proposals include emphasis on human rights and
the rights of minorities; "confirmation of the rule of the Islamic Shari'a;' '31
"revision of the economic and social structures to conform with the teaching
of Islam"; the "restructuring of the constitutional institutions"; "and an
emphasis on the selection of competent leaders." 32 The Assembly commit-
tee considering constitutional amendments continued debating proposed
draft changes to the Constitution until July 11, 1984, when the Assembly
voted to delay the final vote on the proposed amendments pending further
study.33 The latest available draft (prepared before July 11, 1984) of amend-
ments to the Constitution would modify some 80 articles of the 1973 Con-
stitution (which contains a total of 225 articles). As a cornerstone of the
effort to base Sudanese law on Shari'a, article 59 of the Constitution 34 would
be amended under the proposed draft to state in part:
a) The Islamic Shari'a, provisions and trends thereof are the source of legislation
and justice.
c) Any legislation or law which conflicts with a definitive rule of Islamic Shari'a is
void; and any citizen may challenge the laws on this ground before the Supreme
Court.
27. According to one source, "the Assembly has no power to amend the Provisional Order.
The assembly either approves it in toto or disapproves it in toto. Any accepted amendment by
the Assembly will be regarded as a disapproval of the Provisional Order." S. El Effendi,
Legislation in the Sudan under the Permanent Constitution of 1973, 137 (unpublished L.L.M.
thesis, University of Birmingham, England, 1980).
28. Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, art. 155 et seq. (1973).
29. SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN [hereinafter cited as SUNA], May 15, 1984, at 7.
30. Id. June 7, 1984, at 5.
31. The debate within the Sudan for enacting a national constitution based primarily on
Shari'a has existed since independence. See, e.g., H. MUDDATHIR, A MEMORANDUM FOR THE
ENACTMENT OF A SUDAN CONSTITUTION DEVISED FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM (1956).
32. SUNA, supra note 29, June 7, 1984, at 5.
33. SUNA, supra note 29, July 12, 1984, at 9.
34. Art. 59 of the 1973 Constitution states at present: "The state is subject to the Rule of Law
and the Supremacy of the Rule of Law shall be [the] basis of Government."
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d) Every definitive Shari'a rule is effective even if it is not based on legislative
procedures.
Since July 11, 1984, no further action on amending the Constitution has
occurred, at least as of the date of this writing.
35
III. The Nature of Shari'a
The term Shari'a literally means "the road to the watering place," or "the
clear path to be followed." 36 Another source renders the term into English
as the "Whole Duty of Man." 37 In the legal context, Shari'a means "the
sacred law of Islam." 38 The Shari'a is a divine jurisprudence, which is to.say
that the rules thereof are considered as coming directly from God. One
scholar defined the Shari'a as: "The path not only leading to Allah, the Most
High, but the path believed by all Muslims to be the path shown by Allah,
the Creator Himself through His Messenger, Prophet Muhammad.",
39
There are four major sources of Shari'a.40 The first and most important is
the Koran. 4 1 The second is that of the Sunna, which is comprised of collec-
tions of sayings and records (the Hadith) of what the Prophet Muhammad is
recorded to have said, done, approved, or forbidden.42 The third source is
that of consensus (ijma), which is the recorded agreement of Islamic legal
scholars (and perhaps the laity) on any particular point of law. The final
major source of Shari'a is that of the concept of deduction by analogy
(qiyas), which involves the recourse to logic and reason. As stated by one
scholar:
Analogical deduction must have its starting point in a principle of the Qur'an,
Sunna, or consensus, and cannot be used to achieve a result which contradicts a
rule established by any of these three primary material sources.
43
35. December 10, 1984. But cf. supra text preceding note 2.
36. Schacht, Shari'a, in SHORTER ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 524 (H. Gibb & J. Kramers eds.
1974).
37. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the Shari'a, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, VOL.
1: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 85 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny eds. 1955).
38. J. SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 n.1 (1964).
39. A. Dol, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 2 (1984).
40. See generally id. at 21-85; Vesey-Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 85-112; N. COULSON, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 55-60 (1964); Comment, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contempo-
rary Middle Eastern Legal Systems, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384, 387 (1970).
41. See generally A. DENFFER, ULUM AL-QUR'AN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCES OF THE
QUR'AN (1983); J. WANSBROUGH, QURANIC STUDIES: SOURCES AND METHODS OF SCRIPTURAL
INTERPRETATION (1977).
42. See generally M. SHABBIR, THE AUTHORITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF HADITH AS A SOURCE
OF ISLAMIC LAW (1982); A. DENFFER, LITERATURE ON HADITH IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1981).
43. N. Coulson, supra note 40, at 60.
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As another author stated, with perhaps undue simplification, "The Qur'an
may be seen as the constitution of Islam and the Shari'a as the corpus of laws
that explicate it." 44
Although certain provisions of the Shari'a are clear and without ambi-
guity (for example, the amputation of limbs as punishment for theft),45
many areas of the religious law, especially in the commercial area, have
evolved over time to take account of changing social and economic
conditions.4 6 As between various schools of Islamic thought,4 7 the Shari'a
rule on any particular point may vary, although usually within fairly circum-
scribed parameters. In effect, until a Shari'a concept is codified into statu-
tory law (e.g., in the Sudan), there may be uncertainty as to the controlling
applicable rule. This uncertainty has been incorporated into some of the
new Sudanese legislation. For example, the Civil Procedure Act, 1983,
states at section 6(2): "In cases not provided for by any law, the courts shall
act according to Shari'a Law, Sudanese Judicial precedents, custom, justice
and good conscience.", 48 Later in the Act, at section 215, the Sudanese
Supreme Court is given authority to "set aside any decree ... if that decree
violates provisions of Shari'a law."
In separate legislation (the Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983 (promul-
44. D. Pipes, supra note 23, at 36.
45. M. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 2-6 (1982).
46. See generally N. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION (1984).
47. There are two major divisions in Islam: Sunni and Shi'ite. Of the former, there are
currently four major schools of thought: Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. "Although the
majority of Muslims in the Sudan adhere to the Maliki School, the Sudan adopted the Egyptian
practice of applying the Hanafia School." Thompson, The Sources of Law in the New Na-
tions of Africa: A Case Study from the Republic of the Sudan, in AFRICA AND LAW 136 n.9
(T. Hutchison et at. eds. 1968). Under The Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Organization and
Procedure Regulations § 53, 11 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 8 (4th ed. 1955), originally issued in 1916,
the Mohammedan Law Courts, which had jurisdiction over personal status matters such as
marriage, divorce, guardianship, and inheritance, were to render decisions "in accordance with
the authoritative doctrines of the Hanafia jurists except in matters in which the Grand Kadi
otherwise directs in a judicial circular or memorandum .... This provision was repeated
nearly verbatim in § 16 of the Second Schedule to the Civil Procedure Act, 1974, 7 LAWS OF THE
SUDAN 408 (5th ed. 1982), and was re-promulgated in the Civil Procedure Act, 1983, Second
Schedule § 16.
48. In the Civil Justice Ordinance, 1929, 10 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 1 (4th ed. 1955), § 9 stated:
"In cases not provided for by this or any other enactment for the time being in force the Court
shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience." This provision was repealed with
the enactment of the Sudan Civil Code, 1971 (repealed 1973) which provided in part at § 4: "If
no relevant legislative rule is available, the court shall apply the general principles of the
Shari'a; if none is available then it shall decide the matter in accordance with tradition provided
it is not inconsistent with public policy or morality, and if none is available, then in accordance
with the principles of natural j ustice and equity." The Civil Procedure Act, 1974, 7 LAWS OF THE
SUDAN 306 (5th ed. 1982), § 6(2) stated: "In cases not provided for by any law, the Court shall
act according to Sudanese judicial precedents, principles of Shari'a law, custom, justice, and
good conscience." The Civil Procedure Act, 1974, was repealed and replaced by the Civil
Procedure Act, 1983.
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gated Sept. 28, 1983)), it is stated at Section 3, "Notwithstanding any
provisions in any other law, and in the absence of a legislative provision
governing an event: (a) a judge shall apply the existing Shari'a rule as
established by the Koran and the Sunna; .... ,49 A provision of similar
import is contained in Section 3 of the Civil Transactions Act, 1984.50
Consequently, as to those matters in a future dispute which a court might
determine to be either not covered by specific substantive legislation, or
covered by legislation deemed ambiguous in its application, the court is to
apply as yet unspecified rules of Shari'a law. The Sudanese legal community,
generally (although not in all cases) inexpert in the nuances of Islamic law,
appreciates the uncertainty created by the above-cited legislation.
Before concluding this section on the nature of Shari'a, it is appropriate to
note briefly the existence of the controversy in the Sudan over whether, and
to what extent, the country should adopt Islamic law as the central focus of
the legal system. A substantial percentage of Sudan's population has been
Muslim for hundreds of years, 5' and Shari'a courts existed primarily to
resolve certain personal disputes between them (e.g., in the areas of mar-
riage and inheritance law). 52
The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, adopted on May 8, 1973, 53
states at Article 9: "The Islamic Law and custom shall be the main sources of
legislation. Personal matters of non-muslims shall be governed by their
personal laws." Notwithstanding the grant of authority provided by this
Article, the provision remained essentially dormant as regards the promul-
gation of new legislation. In April, 1977, however, President Nimeiri cre-
ated "The Committee to Revise the Laws of the Sudan so as to conform to
the Shari'a Rules and Principles." '54 That Committee proposed and the
People's Assembly considered several bills dealing with such subjects as
liquor prohibition, the interpretation of laws in accordance with Shari'a
49. See Tier, Freedom of Religion Under the Sudan Constitution and Laws, 26 J. AFR. L. 133,
149-50 (1982), which discusses this Act when it was first presented as a bill in the national
People's Assembly in 1978. The full text of the Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983, is set forth
as an appendix at the end of this article.
50. The Civil Transactions Act, 1984 § 3 states:
In applying the provisions of this Act, interpreting the words and expressions in it and in cases
not provided for by any law the Courts shall be guided by Shari'a principles and the rules
embodied in the sources of the Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983.
51. See generally Y. HASAN, THE ARABS AND THE SUDAN FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE EARLY
SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1967); J. TRIMINGHAM, ISLAM IN THE SUDAN (1949).
52. See Fluehr-Lobban, Shari'a Law in the Sudan: History and Trends Since Independence,
28 AFRICA TODAY 69 (1981); Anderson, The Modernization of Islamic Law in the Sudan, 1960
SUDAN L.J. & REP. 292; Anderson, Recent Developments in Shari'a Law in the Sudan, 31 SUDAN
NOTES & REC. 82 (1950); see also supra note 47.
53. The previous constitution was The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of the
Sudan, 1964.
54. SUDANOW, Oct. 1977, at 6, 23; id. Nov. 1979, at 13.
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principles, Zakat,55 and unlawful enrichment. 56 The Assembly never ap-
proved the bills in question, however (until they were submitted anew as
"provisional orders" in 1983-84), and the Committee created by President
Nimeiri ultimately suspended operations after disagreements arose over the
issue of the prohibition of charging interest by banks and businesses, and
over the question of the imposition of certain Islamic punishments, e.g., the
amputation of limbs.
57
Although certain Sudanese legal scholars have argued against the general
implementation of Islamic law in the Sudan, 58 the President proceeded with
the promulgation of Islamic-based legislation, with the support of the
majority of the National People's Assembly. 59 In Equatoria (which is
the southernmost region in the Sudan), however, where the majority of the
population is reportedly either Christian or animist, the Equatoria Regional
Assembly passed resolutions condemning the implementation of Islamic
law, and calling on the President to restore prior legislation.
60
IV. The State of Emergency (April 29-September 29, 1984)
On April 29, 1984, President Nimeiri, acting pursuant to Article 11161 of
the Constitution, declared a state of emergency, suspended specified consti-
55. Zakat is usually translated as "the alms tax," and is considered one of the "five pillars" of
Islam. See generally N. AGHNIDES, MOHAMMEDAN THEORIES OF FINANCE 185-324 (1916);
Cummings et al., Islam and Modern Economic Change, in ISLAM AND DEVELOPMENT 26-32
(J. Esposito ed. 1980).
56. SUDANOW, Feb. 1978, at 21; id. Nov. 1979, at 14; see also Tier, supra note 49, at 148-51.
57. SUDANOW, Sept. 1980, at 14.
58. See, e.g., Lufti, The Future of the English Law in the Sudan, 1967 SUDAN L. J. & REP. 219,
227-235; SUDANOW, Nov. 1977, at 14; id. Jan. 1978, at 7; id. Nov. 1980, at 24; id. June 1981, at
20.
59. In President Nimeiri's speech given on September 22, 1984, see supra note 25, the
President described the implementation of Shari'a in 1983-84 in poetic language: "Islam has
spread through this country without bloodshed. It blew like a gentle breeze, spread like rain and
flourished like a plant and flooded like the Nile."
60. Equatoria Regional Assembly Resolution no. 4/1983 (Nov. 15, 1983); Resolution no.
11/1984 (July 4, 1984). The two other regions in the Southern Sudan, Upper Nile and Bahr el
Ghazal, passed similar resolutions. On the relations between the northern and southern parts of
the Sudan, see generally SOUTHERN SUDAN: REGIONALISM & RELIGION (M. Beshir, ed. 1984);
D. WAI, THE AFRICAN-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN (1981); M. BESHIR, THE SOUTHERN SUDAN:
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (1968).
61. Article 111 of the 1973 Constitution states in part:
If the President of the Republic is satisfied that an imminent danger is threatening the
independence of the country or the integrity and safety of its territory, or its economy, or the
republican organs of the State and its constitutional institutions, or the fulfillment of its
international obligations, or the achievements of the people, he shall declare a State of
Emergency and take the necessary measures to prevent the danger which may include the
suspension of all or any of the freedoms and rights guaranteed by this Constitution provided
that the resort to the Courts shall not be suspended. All measures taken by the President in
accordance with the preceding provisions of this Article shall have the force of law even in
cases where this Constitution requires that such measure shall be passed by the People's
Assembly.
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tutional rights, and promulgated Emergency Regulations governing the
powers of the military during the emergency period. In his speech accom-
panying the declaration of emergency, President Nimeiri justified the
emergency state on the basis of subversion from both within and outside the
country. He accused various unspecified persons, including members of
the judiciary, of impeding the development of Shari'a and accused the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement of both irreligious Marxist-Leninist
activities and thwarting development in the country. The President's speech
included numerous quotes from and references to the Koran, the Prophet,
and Shari'a.6 2 He began his speech with quotes from the Koran, one of
which reads:
Let them laugh a little,
much will they weep,
A recompense for the evil
that they do.
63
The Decree of Emergency, and the accompanying Emergency Regula-
tions, delegated substantial powers and authority to the Sudanese military
forces. The Regulations, in thirty-eight numbered paragraphs, granted to
the military broad-based police and administrative powers. The following
are by way of example: (1) right to enter buildings; (2) right to expropriate
factories and businesses; (3) right to make rules regarding safety in stores
and factories; (4) right to order people to house arrest; (5) right to order
persons to perform specified labors; (6) right to impose a curfew; (7) right
to close buildings; and (8) prohibition of strikes and public demonstrations.
Furthermore, all persons were required to respond truthfully to military
inquiries.
The constitutional rights suspended by the President as part of his Decree
of Emergency were as follows: Art. 40 (no Sudanese shall be deported from
Sudan or prevented from entering Sudan); Art. 41 (freedom of movement
and residence); Art. 42 (right of personal privacy, and secrecy of the mails,
telephone and telegraph); Art. 48 (freedom to express opinions); Art. 49
(freedom of the press); Art. 50 (right of assembly); Art. 51 (right to form
trade unions and associations); Art. 52 (prohibition against conscripted
labor); Art. 58 (right to challenge the constitutionality of laws); Art. 66
(right to be informed of criminal charges, and requirement of arrest war-
rants); Art. 67 (right to release on bail); and Art. 79 (provision stating that
all laws regarding rights and freedoms shall be in accord with the Con-
stitution).
On May 1, 1984, by separate decree, President Nimeiri established nine
Emergency Criminal Courts, later renamed Criminal Decisive Justice
62. President Nimeiri's speech accompanying the declaration of the state of emergency is
reprinted in Arabic in AL-AYAM (Khartoum), April 30, 1984, at 6.
63. THE HOLY QUR'AN, sura 9:82 (A. Yusuf trans. 1938).
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Courts64 (additional ones were set up later), to hear cases involving viola-
tions of the Emergency Regulations as well as violations of the State Secu-
rity Act, 1973,65 and of certain specified provisions of the Penal Code, 1983,
including charges brought against persons for "waging war against the
government," "crimes against public tranquility," crimes committed by civil
servants, gambling, prostitution, alcohol-related offences, smuggling, viola-
tions of price controls, and others. The Emergency Criminal Courts, each of
which was composed of a three-judge panel (one civilian judge and two
military officials), also had jurisdiction to hear cases against persons for acts
or omissions which were deemed to impede the enforcement of the rules of
Shari'a, and for other crimes which the court deemed fit to hear. Criminal
cases not tried or triable in the emergency courts continued to be processed
through the criminal courts in the regular judiciary. President Nimeiri later
stated: "By setting up emergency courts we aim at establishing justice and
acting in compliance with what God has revealed and with what the Prophet
Muhammad has done and said.",66
There initially was no right of appeal from the decisions of the emergency
criminal tribunals, 67 with the results that the decisions of the trial court were
final and the punishments were expeditiously carried out. In cases in which
the death sentence was imposed, the approval of the President of the
Republic was required before the sentence could be carried out. On July 8,
1984, the President by decree established a Decisive Justice Court of
Appeal, "to look into appeals, objections and pleas for clemency." 68
On May 23, 1984, President Nimeiri issued a decree establishing an
Emergency Attorney Office, 69 later renamed the "Decisive Justice Attor-
ney Office," ' 70 and naming seventeen attorneys who were to review all cases
before they were sent to the emergency courts, present the state's side of
cases in the courts, and arrange for the publishing of the facts of cases
processed in the courts. Most of the seventeen appointed attorneys pre-
viously were with the Attorney General's Chambers, but a few were with the
police. Although the Emergency Attorney Office was housed on the prem-
ises of the Attorney General's Chambers, the emergency attorneys reported
directly to the President. Prior to the creation of the Emergency Attorney
64. SUNA, supra note 29, 4917, at 4 (July 8, 1984).
65. 6 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 429 (5th ed. 1982).
66. Saudi Gazette, May 21, 1984, at 2.
67. The use of the institution of appellate jurisdiction in Islamic law has been the exception
rather than the rule. See generally Shapiro, Islam and Appeal, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 350 (1980).
68. SUNA, supra note 29, no. 4917, at 4 (July 8, 1984); Arab News (Jidda, Saudi Arabia),
July 10, 1984, at 4.
69. SUNA, supra note 29, no. 4870, at 3 (May 24, 1984).
70. Id. no. 4917, at 4 (July 8, 1984).
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Office, the police or military brought the accused before the emergency
court and presented the evidence to it.
On June 11, 1984, President Nimeiri decreed the establishment of four-
teen new Civil Emergency Courts (i.e., to try non-criminal cases), nine of
which were trial courts, and the remaining four being courts of appeal. 71
These new courts were to hear all new civil cases and generally to operate
according to the Civil Procedure Act, 1983.
On May 28, 1984, the People's Assembly approved the extension of the
state of emergency for another month, commencing May 29, 1984.72 Later
the People's Assembly delegated to the President the decision as to the
duration of the state of emergency. The state of emergency was renewed for
thirty-day periods until September 29, 1984, when the President decreed the
lifting of the state of emergency.73 As reported in the local Sudanese press
nearly every day during the state of emergency, the Decisive Justice Courts
processed a great volume of cases, the majority of which dealt with prosecu-
tion for such crimes as theft, embezzlement, adultery, prostitution, posses-
sion or dealing in alcoholic beverages or drugs, and violations of price
controls. Where the judgment against an accused was that of guilty, the
defendant was typically sentenced to multiple punishments involving fines,
imprisonment and lashings with a whip. In several cases, generally involving
the crimes of theft or robbery, the convicted defendants were sentenced to
amputation of a limb or limbs.7 4
V. The Civil Transactions Act, 1984
A. INTRODUCTION
The major and most comprehensive piece of legislation enacted in the
Sudan since August 1983 is the Civil Transactions Act, 1984 (C.T.A.),
promulgated by President Nimeiri on February 14, 1984, and approved by
the People's Assembly on March 27, 1984. 75 Because the C.T.A. was
promulgated as a "provisional order" under Art. 106 of the Constitution,
76
it became law and took effect on the date of its initial promulgation. The
71. Id. no. 4890, at 2 (June 12, 1984).
72. Id. no. 4875, at 3-4 (May 29, 1984). The final paragraph of art. 111 of the 1973
Constitution states: "The State of Emergency shall not continue for more than thirty days, and
except where the People's Assembly is dissolved the President shall not renew or extend the
aforesaid period save with the assent of the Assembly."
73. AL-AYAM (Khartoum), September 30, 1984, at 1; N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1984. With the
lifting of the state of emergency the operations of the civil and criminal emergency courts
,eased, and the suspension of the constitutional provisions ended.
74. The term "cross-amputation" is used in Sudan to refer to the amputation of the right
hand and left foot, or the left hand and right foot. Penal Code, 1983 § 64(1)(c).
75. SUNA, supra note 29, no. 4812, at 3 (March 28, 1984).
76. See supra note 26.
VOL. 19, NO. 3
THE ISLAMIC LEGAL REVOLUTION 807
C.T.A. adopted various provisions from the laws of Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, 77
and the Majalla, i.e., the Ottoman Empire's Islamic law of obligations. 78
However, because the source of individual provisions of the C.T.A. is as yet
unknown, and because a substantial number of its provisions are new to the
law of the Sudan, the effect of much of the Act is uncertain.
The scope of the subjects dealt with in the C.T.A., which is comprised of
819 separate sections divided into some 95 chapters, is expansive. In the 22
general divisions of the Act, the following legal subjects, among others, are
codified: contract, tort, unlawful enrichment, sales, gifts, companies, loans,
rent, agency, bailment, gambling, insurance, real property, and waqf.79
Eleven acts were repealed in section 2 of the C.T.A. 80
B. COMPANIES (Sharika)
Part VII of the C.T.A., comprised of sections 246-276, deals with the
subject of sharika, a term translated roughly as "partnership," "society," or
"association." 8 1 Because the scope of this part of the Act is seen by Su-
danese lawyers as applying not only to partnerships and joint ventures, but
also to companies (i.e., corporations), the term "companies" is used herein
to convey the scope of the part.
The notion that Part VII of the C.T.A. applies not only to partnerships,
but also to companies, is consistent with the premise that Islamic law
generally does not recognize juristic (i.e., non-natural) persons such as
corporations that purport to have legal existence independently of the
persons who are members of the entity:8 2
77. This is not the first time the Sudan borrowed legal provisions from Egyptian law. The
Egyptian Civil Code, 1949, was the major source employed by the drafters of the Sudan Civil
Code, 1971 (repealed 1973). Provisions from the Civil Codes of Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, and Syria
were also borrowed from in drafting the Civil Code, 1971. Mustafa, Opting Out of the Common
Law: Recent Developments in the Legal System of the Sudan, 17 J. AFR. L. 133,136-39 (1973).
78. The Majalla (also transliterated as "Mejelle") was the first codification of the Islamic law
of obligations, enacted in the Ottoman empire during the years 1869 to 1876, based on the rules
of the Hanafi School of Islam. N. Coulson, supra note 40, at 151-52. See generally Onar, The
Majalla, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, VOL I: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW
292-308 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny eds. 1955).
79. Waqf is sometimes transliterated as "wakf." The term literally means "to prevent or
restrain, or detention." In Islamic law, it means "state lands which are inalienable, used for
charitable purposes; and.., pious endowments." A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW
231 (2d ed. 1955). See generally N. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 162-69
(1976); Fratcher, The Islamic Wakf, 36 Mo. L. REV. 153 (1971); Anderson, Waqfs in East
Africa, 3 J. AFR. L. 152 (1959).
80. Sudanese Disposition of Lands Restriction Act, 1918; Disposal of Unoccupied Town and
Village Lands Act, 1922; Recovery of Lost and Stolen Property Act, 1924; The Pre-Emption
Act, 1928; The Prescription and Limitation Act, 1928; Unregistered Land Act, 1970; Rent
Restriction Act, 1982; Sales Act, 1974; Agency Act, 1974; Contract Act, 1974; Land Settlement
and Registration Act, 1925 (partial repeal).
81. J. Schacht, supra note 38, at 155, 302. The C.T.A. does not define sharika.
82. J. Schacht, supra note 38, at 125. Section 23 of the C.T.A. defines "juristic persons" to
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The concept of corporation does not exist in Islamic law. . . . There is also no
freedom of association, and only certain kinds of society, or more specifically of
mercantile partnership as opposed to joint ownership, are permitted.83
While the question is not without doubt, principally because the concept of
sharika is new to the Sudan, all Sudanese lawyers contacted by this author
are of the view that Part VII of the C.T.A. applies to companies, at least as
to those whose principal office is in the Sudan. 84
The major source of confusion surrounding the application of Part VII to
companies results from the fact that, although some eleven legislative acts
were repealed with the passage of the C.T.A., the Companies Act, 1925,85
was not repealed. The Companies Act, 1925, is the statute under which new
companies are chartered by the Sudanese government, and which regulates
the internal structure of companies so chartered. A division of the Attorney
General's Chambers in Khartoum is the authority which issues new charters
under the 1925 Act,86 and as of the date this article went to press,87 it has
continued to issue charters under that Act.
The differences between the provisions of the C.T.A. relating to com-
panies, and that of the Companies Act, 1925, are highlighted by considering
the major advantages of the corporation as a vehicle for doing business.
These advantages are generally seen as follows: (1) a method of raising
substantial amounts of capital; (2) easy transferability of interests;
(3) perpetual existence of the entity; and (4) limited liability for the investors
thereof. The two statutes diverge primarily on the subjects of perpetual
existence and limited liability.
By the use of the words "perpetual existence," it is meant here that an
entity continues to exist notwithstanding the death of one or more of the
investors thereof. Under the Companies Act, 1925, unless the articles of
association (i.e., governing instruments) provide that a company shall exist
only for a limited period of time, the company, once chartered, remains in
existence notwithstanding the death of one of the shareholders. 88 Under the
include "commercial corporations" and "associations and corporations created in accordance
with the provisions of the law." Section 24 states in part: "A juristic person enjoys, within the
limits established by law, all rights, with the exception of those rights which are inherent in the
nature of an individual."
83. J. Schacht, supra note 38, at 155-56.
84. Section 11(2) of the C.T.A. provides that as to companies whose principal office lies
outside the Sudan, the law of that country shall apply to such companies. To what extent section
11(2) enables foreign companies to escape the other provisions of the C.T.A. is as yet unclear.
85. 1 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 240 (5th ed. 1976).
86. Miscellaneous Amendments (Distribution of the Functions of Certain Ministries) Act,
1979, § 2.
87. June 1985.
88. Companies Act, 1925, §§ 20(2), 194(1). An exception is provided in § 140, which
prohibits the continuance of business beyond six months if the number of shareholders is
reduced, in the case of a private company, below two, or in the case of any other company,
below seven.
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C.T.A., however, the issue is less clear. Under Sections 253(c) and 254 of
the C.T.A., upon the death, insanity, bankruptcy, or incapacity of any
of the partners or shareholders, the company ceases to exist, unless the heirs
of the deceased party agree to the continuance of the company (and retain
the deceased's shares or sell the shares back to the company). Good corpo-
rate planning under the C.T.A. would obviously dictate that at the inception
of a business enterprise (including a company), all of the partners or share-
holders thereto agree in writing, on behalf of themselves as well as on behalf
of their heirs and executors, that in the event of the death of any of them, the
enterprise will continue to exist, in effect binding in advance those persons
who could in the future disrupt the continuity of the enterprise. It is unclear,
however, whether such corporate planning is permissible under the provi-
sions of the C.T.A. The present status of existing corporations, previously
chartered under the Companies Act, 1925, is also called into question when
any of the shareholders die.
On the subject of limited liability, the Companies Act, 1925, is clear:
section 2(2) defines the term "company" to mean "a company formed and
registered under this Act, and having the liability of its members limited to
the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by them." The
certificate of incorporation issued by the Attorney General's Chambers
"shall certify . . . that the company is incorporated and limited," with the
effect that the potential liability of subscribers to interests in the company, in
the event of the termination of the company, under circumstances where,
for example, the company is unable to pay its debts, is not to exceed "the
amount, if any, unpaid on the shares in respect of which he is liable as a
present or past member." 89 Moreover, under the Companies Act, 1925,
even the shareholder's limited liability, as above stated, can be further
limited by a "policy of insurance or other contract whereby the liability of
individual members on the policy or contract is restricted, or whereby the
funds of the company are alone made liable in respect of the policy or
contract. "90
Section 252(4) of the C.T.A., however, provides that if a company is
indebted with respect to its business activities, it must settle such debts, first,
from the assets of the company. Failing the existence of sufficient company
assets to settle the debts, all members of the company must jointly discharge
the debt from their personal assets, with each member contributing in the
proportion to which they hold interests in the company, unless there is an
agreement among the shareholders that they will share equally in the
payment of debts. The C.T.A. does not expressly authorize an agreement
between the shareholders whereby certain of their number are excluded
89. Id. §§ 20, 149(d).
90. Id. § 149(e).
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entirely from the obligation to contribute to the payment of debts (where the
company itself has insufficient assets to do so). Whether a company in a
contract with a third party can validly stipulate, with the agreement of the
third party, that in the event of default by the company, the assets of
individual shareholders will not be subject to the payment of any resulting
liability, is not clear under the Act 91 and will not be definitively resolved
until there are judicial interpretations of the C.T.A. or amendment of the
legislation.
Because the C.T.A. provides in section 819 that its provisions shall prevail
over the sections of every other law in matters to which the C.T.A. applies,
and because section 1(2) provides that the C.T.A. shall apply to all litigated
cases pending but as yet uncompleted as of February 14, 1984, the conclu-
sion can be reached that the provisions of the C.T.A., as respects the
duration of individual companies upon the death of a shareholder and
the question of the potential liability of shareholders, will prevail over the
related sections of the Companies Act, 1925.92
VI. The Prohibition Against Interest (Riba)
The doctrine of riba has its source in the Koran.93 It means literally "to
grow or inflate ' 94 or "increase or excess" 95 depending on which commenta-
tor is consulted. In practice, the term means "any unjustified increase of
capital for which no compensation is given," 96 and is deemed to include a
prohibition of the charging of interest by a lender.97 For a Muslim to charge
interest on money lent is deemed to be "a sin against Allah." '98 Because
of the strict prohibition against interest in the Shari'a, various "devices"
91. Section 119 of the C.T.A. authorizes stipulations imposed by one party to a contract if
known by the other party to the contract at the time when the contract was entered into. Section
120 specifically authorizes a contractual provision which exempts any of the parties from
liability or limits the liability of any party, but section 120(4) authorizes a court to refuse to
enforce any such exemption:
which is contrary to the spirit of the contract or clearly unjust to the party against whom it is to
be invoked or if that term deprives such party of the rights which he contracted to enjoy or if it
is contrary to the provisions of the law or public order.
92. Further, section 6(3) of the Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act, 1974, 7
LAWS OF THE SUDAN 137, states: "The provisions of a subsequent law shall prevail over those of
a preceding law to the extent of any inconsistency."
93. THE HOLY QUR'AN, sura 2:275-80; 3:130; 4:161; 30:39 (A. Yusuf trans. 1938).
94. S. TALEQUANI, ISLAM AND OWNERSHIP 107 (1983).
95. J. Schacht, supra note 38, at 145.
96. Schacht, Riba, in SHORTER ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 471 (H. Gibb & J. Kramers eds.
1974).
97. "Riba is any increase sought through illegal means, such as usury, bribery, profiteering,
fraudulent trading, etc." A. ALl, THE HOLY QUR'AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY
1062 n.3552 (3d ed. 1938).
98. SUDANOW, Dec. 1982, at 32.
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(hiyal) were designed to circumvent the rule. The classical device was that of
the "double sale," whereby the lender would purchase in cash an object
from the borrower; the borrower would then contract with the lender to
repurchase the same object at a higher price, with the price to be paid at a
later date. 99
In modern times, Islamic finance relies on various mechanisms of risk
sharing (also known as profit and loss sharing) between the person who
provides the capital and the entrepreneur, 1°° a system which in the Sudan
has been substantially more profitable than "interest" banking. One recent
study determined that while commercial banks in the country operated at a
profit margin of about six percent, the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) in 1981
received a return on its investment of 100 percent.101 Another study indi-
cated that during the period 1979-81, the equity of Faisal Islamic Bank
(Sudan), "which included both paid-up shares and reinvested profits, in-
creased by 358 percent, while total commercial banks' equity (in Sudan)
grew by only 70 percent. 102
The Islamic banks, while not imposing "interest" as such, impose a
variety of "service charges," which they deem valid under the Shari'a "as
long as the amount of the service charges is in no way related to the financial
value of the service. 10 3
In the Sudan, the advent of Islamic banking commenced with the passage
of the Faisal Sudanese Bank Act, 1977,104 which established the Faisal
Islamic Bank (Sudan) to be operated "in accordance with the doctrines of
Islamic Law," 105 and granted the new bank substantial incentives and
advantages, in order to encourage Islamic banking 10 6 and as part of the
"further Islamization" of the country.' 0 7 Among the exemptions granted to
the Faisal Islamic Bank was the complete exemption from all taxes108 and
laws regulating insurance. 109 The Act also exempted from taxation the funds
99. J. Schacht, supra note 38, at 79; N. Coulson, supra note 40, at 139.
100. See generally T. WOHLERS-SCHARF, ARAB AND ISLAMIC BANKS 75-86 (1983); M. SIDDIQI,
BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST (1983); M. SIDDIQI, ISSUES IN ISLAMIC BANKING: SELECTED PAPERS
97-123 (1983); S. Khan, Profit and Loss Sharing, ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REV., Mar.
1984, at 48-50; The Islamic Banking Surge, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1984, at 52.
101. SUDANOW, Dec. 1983, at 24.
102. R. Brown & E. Shaaeldin, Towards an Understanding of Islamic Banking in Sudan:
The Case of Faisal Islamic Bank 1-2 (Development Studies and Research Center, University of
Khartoum, Discussion Paper no. 15; May 1982), copy on file with the author.
103. A. HAMDI, THE OPERATIONS OF FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK (SUDAN) 7 (1981).
104. 10 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 365 (5th ed. 1982).
105. Id. § 4.
106. SUDANOW, May 1982, at 28.
107. SUDANOW, Dec. 1983, at 23.
108. 10 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 365 (5th ed. 1982), at § 7(1)(a).
109. Id. § 6(b). In 1978, Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) announced the creation of the Islamic
Cooperative Insurance Company. SUDANOW, Nov. 1978, at 35.
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deposited with the Bank for the purpose of investment,1 1 0 and the salaries,
wages, gratuities and pensions of all employees and officers of the Bank."'
Faisal Bank commenced operations in Khartoum on May 10, 1978 with an
authorized capital of six million Sudanese pounds. By April 1983, the
Bank's authorized capital had been increased to one hundred million
Sudanese pounds, with ten bank branches operating in the country.11 2 On
February 7, 1984, by a "provisional order" issued by President Nimeiri, all
of the exemptions originally granted to the Bank regarding taxation, as well
as certain other statutory exemptions relating to insurance and exchange
controls, were eliminated, effective January 1, 1984.
The first Sudanese legislation of general application dealing with the
Islamic prohibition against interest came with the promulgation of the Civil
Procedure Act, 1983, in August, 1983. The most important provision in that
regard is contained at section 110: "The Court shall under no circumstance
whatsoever make a decree ordering payment of interest on the principal sum
adjudged." Several other sections in the 1983 Act, dealing with the subject
of the enforcement by lenders of mortgages, delete references that existed in
the now-repealed Civil Procedure Act, 1973, to calculations by a court of
interest due on the debts in issue before the court.t 1 3 It thus now appears
that in all litigated matters, the courts will not enter judgments enforcing the
provisions of agreements which provide for the payment of interest.
Separately, Section 281 of the C.T.A. provides that where a loan agree-
ment contains a provision which would require the borrower to pay back to
the lender funds over and above the principal amount of the loan (e.g.,
interest), such provision shall be void, but the balance of the loan contract
shall remain valid. It is unclear whether section 281 would prohibit the
"service charges" typically charged by the Islamic banks.
A regulation was announced in March 1984 which provided that no new
interest-charging banks are to be established in the country, and as to those
commercial banks presently doing business in the Sudan, no new branches
are to be opened. 114 Also, as reported in April 1984, the Islamic Bank for
Development and Cooperation commenced operations in Khartoum, the
first Islamic bank in the Sudan owned by the Sudanese government.
115
Under the Bank of Sudan Act, 1959,116 which established the Bank of
110. 10 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 365 (5th ed. 1982), at § 7(1)(b).
111. Id. § 7(1)(c).
112. ARAIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REV., Sept. 1984, at 52.
113. Civil Procedure Act, 1983, §§ 127(1), 128(1), 131(1).
114. Saudi Gazette, March 31, 1984, at 1.
115. ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REV., Apr. 1984, at 43. In November, 1982, President
Nimeiri inaugurated the National Bank for Popular Development (NBPD), a joint Sudanese-
Egyptian venture including, among others, Sudanese government companies. SUDANOW, Dec.
1982, at 34. The NBPD engages in part in Islamic banking practices.
116. 4 LAWS OF THE SUDAN 236 (5th ed. 1976).
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Sudan as the central bank of the government, the Bank has the power "to
make instructions to any bank, or person who carries on any banking
business, and such bank or person shall be bound by such instructions and
shall implement all matters connected with them."' 1 7 The Bank of Sudan
exercised its rule-making power to deal with the subject of interest in a
regulation dated February 22, 1984. In that regulation, the Bank ordered all
other banks in the country to stop paying interest on commercial accounts
holding foreign currency.
An important Sudanese development in the enforcement of the Koranic
prohibition against riba involves a recent criminal case, The State v. Laleet
Ratinlahl Shah, brought against a non-Muslim resident charged with engag-
ing in the lending of money without a license and charging interest. 118 The
Sudanese Penal Code, 1983, does not expressly refer to the charging of
interest as a criminal offense. The Court of Appeal in Khartoum, however,
in affirming the conviction by the trial court in Laleet, held that inasmuch as
the Koran expressly forbids the charging of interest, the general provisions
of the Judgments (Basic Rules) Act, 1983, section 3, which provides that
provisions of Shari'a shall be applied in the absence of other legislative
provisions,19 were applicable. The Laleet case is the first time in Sudan that
engaging in riba has been made subject to criminal prosecution,1 20 and that
case will have the undoubted effect of catalyzing the further Islamization of
the banking industry in the country.121
117. Id. § 6A. This section was first added to the Act in a slightly different version in 1970
(Act no. 41). With respect to certain of the credit and interest policies initiated by the Bank of
Sudan, see generally SUDANOW, Dec. 1983, at 26.
118. The case was originally brought in 1984 in Omdurman Criminal Court No. 1, and was
affirmed on appeal (although with a modification of the criminal sentence to be imposed) on
December 2, 1984. The text of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Khartoum is reprinted in
Al Sahafa (Khartoum) Dec. 3, 1984, at 2. The defendant was also charged and convicted of
violating foreign exchange regulations, operating as a commercial agent without a license, and
engaging in banking operations without a license.
119. See the appendix to this article for the full text of the Act.
120. The Court of Appeal in Laleet also, for the first time, interpreted the Prevention of
Unlawful Enrichment Act, 1966 (Act no. 18)-to apply to riba. Section 3(1)(b) of that Act defines
"unlawful enrichment" to include any property obtained "through favouritism or any other
means prejudicial to the public interest." In Laleet, a challenge in the Sudanese Supreme Court
to the constitutionality of criminally charging the defendant for engaging in riba, based on art.
70 of the 1973 Constitution, was dismissed. Art. 70 states in part: "No person shall be punished
for an act which was not an offence at the time he committed that act. ... In Sudan,
constitutional issues are raised by separate petition to the Sudanese Supreme Court. Civil
Procedure Act, 1983, §§ 323 et seq.
121. In addition to Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan), there are some five other privately owned
Islamic Banks operating in Sudan as of December, 1984, including the Al Baraka Sudanese
Islamic Bank (commenced operations in Khartoum in March, 1984), and the Islamic Bank for
Western Sudan (which opened in Khartoum in August, 1984). See generally SUDANOW, Nov.
1984, at 28; id. April 1984, at 19.
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APPENDIX
THE JUDGMENTS (BASIC RULES) ACT, 1983122
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, the President of the
Republic:
In accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Constitution,
hereby makes the following Provisional Order:
1. This Provisional Order may be cited as "The Judgments (Basic
Rules) Act, 1983," and shall come into force as from the date of
signature.
2. In interpreting legislative provisions, unless such provisions are
already interpreted or have been given a definite meaning:
(a) a judge shall presume that the legislator did not intend to contra-
dict Shari'a for the purpose of holding a definite duty in abeyance or
allowing that which is clearly prohibited and shall pay due regard to
Shari'a directives of approbation and disapprobation;
(b) a judge shall interpret generalities and discretionary provisions in
accordance with the rules, principles and general spirit of Shari'a; and
(c) a judge shall interpret jurisprudential terms and expressions in
the light of the basic linguistic rules of Islamic jurisprudence.
3. Notwithstanding any provisions in any other law, and in the absence
of a legislative provision governing an event:
(a) a judge shall apply the existing Shari'a rule as established by the
Koran and the Sunna;
(b) in the absence of any such provision, the judge shall exert his
thought and be guided in so doing by the principles hereinafter
mentioned, taking them with due regard to their complementarity
and observing their chronology with respect to the priority of their
consideration and preponderance:
(i) to pay due regard to the unanimity of Muslim Jurists, the
exigencies of the totality of Shari'a rules, its general principles
and Shari'a directives respecting questions of detail in the matter;
(ii) to render justice by way of analogy with the provisions of
Shari'a for the purpose of realizing its objectives or following its
example or comparing with its method in rendering justice;
(iii) to pay due regard to what achieves goodness, justice and
parries corruption, evaluating the same in a manner destined to
realize the ends of Shari'a and the objectives of life under com-
122. Unofficial draft translation from the original Arabic provided to the author by the
Attorney General's Chambers, Khartoum.
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plete Shari'a rule in the context of the present circumstances and
that which is not repealed by subsidiary Shari'a rules;
(iv) presumption of innocence, non-prohibition of acts and in-
dulgence in imposition of duties;
(v) to be guided by established judicial precedents in the Sudan
insofar as they are not inconsistent with Shari'a and by subsidiary
legal opinions and confirmed jurisprudential rules set forth by
Muslim Jurists;
(vi) to have due regard to usage in dealings in matters not
inconsistent with the rules of Shari'a Law or the principles of
natural justice;
(vii) to strive to find the significations of justice prescribed by
noble human laws and the rules of justice and equity enshrined in
good conscience.
Made under my hand at the People's Palace on the 21st of Zul Hajja 1403
A.H., being the 28th of September 1983 A.D.
Ga'afar Muhammed Nimeiri
President of the Republic
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